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Abstract
Membership Inference Attacks exploit the vul-
nerabilities of exposing models trained on cus-
tomer data to queries by an adversary. In a re-
cently proposed implementation of an auditing
tool for measuring privacy leakage from sensi-
tive datasets, more refined aggregates like the
Log-Loss scores are exposed for simulating in-
ference attacks as well as to assess the total
privacy leakage based on the adversary’s pre-
dictions. In this paper, we prove that this ad-
ditional information enables the adversary to
infer the membership of any number of dat-
apoints with full accuracy in a single query,
causing complete membership privacy breach.
Our approach obviates any attack model train-
ing or access to side knowledge with the adver-
sary. Moreover, our algorithms are agnostic
to the model under attack and hence, enable
perfect membership inference even for models
that do not memorize or overfit. In particular,
our observations provide insight into the extent
of information leakage from statistical aggre-
gates and how they can be exploited.
1 Introduction
Protecting customer privacy is of fundamental
importance when training ML models on sen-
sitive customer data. While explicit data de-
identification and anonymization mechanisms can
help protect privacy leakage to some extent, re-
search has shown that this leakage can hap-
pen when models trained on customer data can
be queried by an external entity (Homer et al.,
2008; Sankararaman et al., 2009; Li et al., 2013;
Shokri et al., 2017), or when statistical aggre-
gates on the dataset are exposed (Dwork and Naor,
2010; Dwork et al., 2017).
Recently, it was shown that the knowledge of
Log-Loss scores leaks information about true la-
bels of test datapoints under some constraints on
the prior knowledge on these labels (Whitehill,
2018). However, extracting meaningful infor-
mation from these aggregates on arbitrary large
datasets, while maintaining reasonable inference
accuracy in a limited number of queries to a Log-
Loss oracle remained an open problem, specially
in cases when no prior knowledge is available.
Moreover, the number of queries required by their
algorithm scales with the size of the test dataset.
We address this problem in this paper and provide
multiple algorithms for optimal inference of arbi-
trarily many test labels in a single query using the
exposed Log-Loss scores. This sheds insight into
the extent of information leakage from this statisti-
cal aggregate and how it can be exploited to game
a classification task, for example, in the context
of data-mining competitions like Kaggle, KDD-
Cup and ILSVRC Challenge (Russakovsky et al.,
2015).
More concretely, consider the following sce-
nario: you are tasked with a critical binary classifi-
cation problem. The quality of your solution will
be assessed through a performance score (Log-
Loss) on an unknown test dataset. If you score the
highest among all candidate solutions, then you
win a significant cash prize. You are allowed only
two attempts at the solution and the best of the two
scores will be considered.
Is it possible to game this system in a way that
your score is always the highest amongst all can-
didates, without even training any classifier?
We answer this in the affirmative by showing
that the knowledge of only the size of the test
dataset is enough to construct a scheme that can
game any binary classifier that uses the Log-Loss
metric to assess the quality of classification. This
scheme is completely agnostic of the underlying
classification task and hence, sheds light on how
a malicious modeller can fake a perfect classifier
by demonstrating zero test error. We assume that
the oracle reports the scores truthfully on the entire
dataset.
A particularly interesting application of our ob-
servation is for breaching membership privacy,
where an attacker can query the model for infer-
ence on a set of datapoints and use these responses
to infer what datapoints were used to train that
model. Given blackbox access to a model and a
data point x, this attack model is a binary classi-
fier to infer the membership of x in the training
dataset of the target model using its output on x –
the more information this output reveals, the bet-
ter this inference can be performed. Consequently,
the accuracy of the attack depends on how well
the adversary can capture the difference in model
performance.
Nonetheless, the popularity of this attack has
made it a strong candidate for assessing privacy
leakage of models trained on datasets containing
sensitive information (Song and Shmatikov,
2019; Backes et al., 2016; Pyrgelis et al.,
2017; Salem et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2019;
Murakonda and Shokri, 2020). A successful
attack can compromise the privacy of the users
that contribute to the training dataset. Our results
show that an oracle access to Log-Loss scores (for
example, when using open source privacy auditors
on sensitive datasets (Murakonda and Shokri,
2020)) enables full privacy breach in a single
query.
1.1 Related Work
In recent work, (Blum and Hardt, 2015) demon-
strated how an attacker can estimate the test set
labels in a competition setting with probability
2/3. Similarly, and more related to our work,
(Whitehill, 2016, 2018) showed how the knowl-
edge of AUC and Log-Loss scores can be used
to make inference on similar test sets by issu-
ing multiple queries for these statistics. Our
work extends the latter to optimize the number
of queries. Similarly, through a Monte Carlo al-
gorithm, (Matthews and Harel, 2013) show how
knowing most of the test labels can help estimate
the remaining labels upon gaining access to an em-
pirical ROC curve. However, their algorithm is far
from exact inference with no apriori information
of the true labels.
We further observe that the theme of our work
is related to two fields of research: adaptive data
analysis, and protections of statistical aggregates
using Differential Privacy (DP). In adaptive data
analysis (Hardt and Ullman, 2014; Dwork et al.,
2015), an attacker leverages multiple (adaptive)
queries to sequentially construct a complete ex-
ploit (e.g., of a test set). Conversely, with DP
(Dwork et al., 2006) the objective is to protect the
aggregate statistics, such as those exploited by
(Whitehill, 2016), from leaking information.
1.2 Log-Loss Metric
We begin with reminding the reader of the defini-
tion of the Log-Loss metric on a given prediction
vector with respect to a binary labeling of the dat-
apoints in the test dataset (Murphy, 2012).
Definition 1 (Log-Loss). For a dataset D =
[d1, . . . , d|D|], let ℓ ∈ {0, 1}
|D| be a binary la-
beling and x = [x1, . . . , x|D|] ∈ [0, 1]
|D| be
a vector of prediction scores. Let g(ℓi, xi) =
ℓi loge xi + (1 − ℓi) loge(1 − xi). Then, the Log-
Loss (LL in short) for xwith respect to ℓ is defined
as LL(x, ℓ) = − 1|D|
∑|D|
i=1 g(ℓi, xi).
The definition easily generalizes for multi-class
classifiers. A common variant is to ignore the nor-
malization by |D|. Our constructions in this paper
are scale-invariant.
2 Algorithms for Exact Inference using
Log-Loss scores
In this section, we discuss multiple algorithms for
single shot inference of all ground-truth labels us-
ing carefully constructed prediction vectors that
help establish a 1-1 correspondence of the Log-
Loss scores with the labelings of the test dataset.
We, therefore, refer to the entity that performs
such an inference as an adversary.
2.1 Inference using Twin Primes
Our first algorithm uses twin-primes, i.e.
pairs of prime numbers within distance 2
of each other (see OEIS A001359 from
https://oeis.org/A001359.). It has been
conjectured that infinitely many such pairs ex-
ist (de Polignac, 1851; Dunham, 2013). For a
dataset of some finite size |D| ≥ 1, we require
|D| such pairs. The main steps of our approach
are outlined in Algorithm 1 and the following
theorem proves its correctness.
Theorem 1. If the Twin-Prime Conjecture holds,
then for any dataset D, the Log-Loss scores re-
turned by Algorithm 1 are in 1-1 correspondence
with the binary labelings for datapoints in D.
Algorithm 1: Inference on dataset D =
[d1, . . . , d|D|] using Twin Primes
Let 5 ≤ p1 < · · · < p|D| be a sequence of
(smallest) primes such that pi + 2 is also a
prime for all i. Form the prediction vector
for D as x =
[
p1
2+p1
, . . . ,
p|D|
2+p|D|
]
. Obtain
the Log-Loss on x and use that to infer the
ground-truth labels for D using Algorithm 2.
Proof. For a fixed D and labeling ℓ, it suffices to
show that −|D| · LL(x, ℓ) takes all unique val-
ues. From Definition 1, observe that the following
holds:
−|D|·LL(x, ℓ) = loge
(
2|D0|
∏
dj∈D1
pj
(2 + p1) · · · (2 + p|D|)
)
.
Now, fix any two labelings ℓ1 and ℓ2 for D. If
the number of zeros in them are different, then it
is easy to see that x will give different Log-Loss
scores on both of them, since the exponent of 2 in
the numerator will be different for these two label-
ings and all other prime numbers being odd in the
denominator, no common factors will exist to can-
cel this effect. If the number of zeros is the same,
then observe that:
|D| (LL(x, ℓ1)− LL(x, ℓ2)) = loge
∏
di∈D
(2)
1
pi∏
dj∈D
(1)
1
pj
,
where D
(2)
1 is the set of datapoints with label 1 in
ℓ2 (similarly for D
(1)
1 ). Now, since ℓ1 and ℓ2 are
different, there must exist some index 1 ≤ k ≤
|D| for which ℓ1(k) = 0 and ℓ2(k) = 1. Thus,
pk will appear in the numerator but not in the de-
nominator. Moreover, since the denominator is
also a product of primes, it does not divide the
numerator in this case, and hence, the difference
LL(x, ℓ1)− LL(x, ℓ2) is non-zero.
As an example of this technique, assume |D| =
2. The primes we can use for this construction
are 5 and 11, so that the prediction vectors can
be set as v1 = [5/7, 2/7] and v2 = [11/13, 2/13].
Then, the following lists the log-loss values for the
prediction vector x∗ = [5/7, 11/13] (as per Algo-
Algorithm 2: True Labels from Log-Loss
Input: Log-Loss score s
Output: True Labels for datapoints in D
Let es|D| = p/q (lowest form) and
q = 2mp1 · · · pk. Find the set of
(zero-indexed) locations I of primes
p1 . . . pk in OEIS A001359. Construct the
labeling ℓ as follows: Insert 1 in indices
specified by I , and 0s elsewhere. Return ℓ.
rithm 1):
−2LL(x∗, [0, 0]) = loge
2
7
+ loge
2
13
= loge
4
91
−2LL(x∗, [0, 1]) = loge
2
7
+ loge
11
13
= loge
22
91
−2LL(x∗, [1, 0]) = loge
5
7
+ loge
2
13
= loge
10
91
−2LL(x∗, [1, 1]) = loge
5
7
+ loge
11
13
= loge
55
91
Our construction allows us to give an algorithm
to determine the true labeling from the Log-Loss
value, without having to consult a lookup table
(see Algorithm 2). This follows from Gauss’s Fun-
damental Theorem of Arithmetic (GFoA), that ev-
ery positive integer is either a prime or is uniquely
factorizable as a product of primes (Gauss, 1966).
We assume that the Log-Loss score s is reported
such that es|D| = p/q is a rational number in its
reduced form (i.e. with q 6= 0 and gcd(p, q) = 1),
and that, without loss of generality, the prediction
vector was constructed using the first |D| prime
numbers, as specified in Algorithm 1.
As an example, suppose on a dataset of size
3, the Log-Loss s is reported such that e3s =
1729/170. Note that this requirement of knowing
|D| is not necessary, since it is equal to the num-
ber of factors of the numerator of es|D|. Now, writ-
ing the denominator 170 = 21 × 5 × 17, we note
that there is 1 zero in the labeling, and the other
two labels are one. From OEIS A001359, we note
that 5 and 17 are the first and third prime numbers
in the series (when we start counting from 5), re-
spectively, and hence, the first and third datapoints
must have labels one. Thus, we have inferred that
the true labeling for D must be [1, 0, 1].
We acknowledge that the assumption of know-
ing es|D| in its reduced fraction form is equivalent
to assuming knowledge of swith infinite precision.
We defer this investigation to Section 3.
2.2 Extension to Multiple Classes
A similar construction can be used to infer all true
labels in a multi-class setting as well. For the One-
vs-All approach, then it is trivial to see that the
individual Log-Loss scores for each class reveal
datapoints from that class. For the K-ary classi-
fier approach (K being the number of classes), the
following construction works: Let p1, . . . , p|D| be
the first |D| primes. For datapoint di, use the fol-
lowing prediction vector:
vi =
[
1/αi, pi/αi, . . . , p
K−1
i /αi
]
,
where αi =
∑K−1
j=0 p
j
i , thus, forming the predic-
tion matrix vD = [v1, . . . , v|D|]. Given the true
labels ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,K}|D|, it can be shown that the
following holds:
−LL(vD, ℓ)+
K∑
j=1
loge αj = loge p
ℓ1−1
1 · · · p
ℓ|D|−1
|D| .
This gives the required injection, since the sum on
the left is constant for fixed K and |D|, and the
product on the right is unique (following GFoA).
2.3 Inference using Binary Representations
In Algorithm 1, the main reason why we chose
distinct primes was that when the denominator
of es|D| was factorized, the prime factors would
uniquely define the locations of 1s in the binary
labeling. The same 1-1 correspondence can be
achieved by observing that the each binary label-
ing is also equivalent to a binary representation
(base 2) of a natural number (see Algorithm 3). By
using powers of 2 for only the indices correspond-
ing to locations of 1s in the binary labeling, when
the denominator is now factorized, it produces in
the exponent of the 2 an integer, whose binary rep-
resentation (when reversed) is exactly the same as
the labeling. This also helps eliminate the depen-
dence on the Twin Prime Conjecture. The follow-
ing theorem formally establishes this proof.
Theorem 2. For any dataset D, the Log-Loss
scores returned by Algorithm 3 are in 1-1 corre-
spondence with the labelings for datapoints in D.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, for a
fixedD and labeling ℓ, it suffices to show that d =
|D| · LL(x, ℓ) takes all unique values. Let I1 be
the set of indices in ℓ that have value 1. Now, since
Algorithm 3: Exact Inference using Binary
Representations
Form the prediction vector for
D = [d1, . . . , d|D|] as
x =
[
α1
1+α1
, . . . ,
α|D|
1+α|D|
]
, where αi = 2
2i−1 .
Obtain the Log-Loss on x and use that to
infer the true labels for D.
xi =
22
i−1
1+22i−1
, we can write the following:
d =
|D|∑
j=1
loge
(
1 + 22
j−1
)
−
∑
i∈I1
2i−1
log2 e
.
Thus, if LL(x, ℓ1) = LL(x, ℓ2) for two distinct
labelings ℓ1 and ℓ2, then from above, it is easy to
see that this can only happen when
∑
i∈I
(1)
1
2i−1 =∑
i∈I
(2)
1
2i−1, where I
(j)
1 is the index set (similar to
I1) for labeling ℓj . Now, since every positive inte-
ger has a unique binary representation, this implies
that I
(1)
1 = I
(2)
1 , which can only happen when the
two labelings are the same. Moreover, note that
since powers of 2 are always even, the product in
the denominator of the equation above has no com-
mon factors with the numerator. Thus, each binary
labeling of x gives a unique Log-Loss score.
As an example, if the true labels for a dataset D
containing four datapoints are [1, 0, 1, 1], the expo-
nent of 2 can be the natural number represented
using the binary representation 1101, which is 13.
Similarly, if the exponent observed is, say 18, then
the corresponding binary representation is 10010,
and hence, the true labels must be [0, 1, 0, 0, 1].
3 Adapting to Fixed Precision Arithmetic
Can we design prediction vectors such that the
Log-Loss scores are atleast some ∆ apart from
each other, where∆ is limited by the floating point
precision on the machine used to simulate our in-
ference algorithms?
For distinguishing scores with φ significant dig-
its, since there are a total of 10φ possible numeric
values, the threshold value of separation is ∆ ≥
10−φ. If the separation in the scores is smaller
than this value, then they cannot be distinguished.
Inverting this inequality gives φ ≥
⌈
log10
(
1
∆
)⌉
.
For example, if one wishes to have the scores sep-
arated by ∆ ≥ 0.2, then the minimum amount
of precision required is ⌈log10 5⌉ = 1. For ∆ =
0.002, we would need φ ≥ ⌈log10 500⌉ = 3 digits.
We can reduce the requirement of a large preci-
sion by combining the AUC and Log-Loss scores,
which is common in most practical situations
where multiple performance metrics are evaluated
to give a holistic overview of classifier inference.
This way, even if they are individually not-unique
but the tuple is unique for each labeling, exact
inference can be done. For example, consider a
dataset D = [d1, d2, d3] and the prediction vec-
tor v = [0.2, 0.4, 0.6]. Clearly, neither the AUC
scores nor the Log-Loss scores are unique. How-
ever, if we consider the two scores together, the
labels can be uniquely identified. Moreover, pre-
cision of only two significant digits is enough to
make this decision.
A rough analysis tells us that with φ significant
digits, there are 10φ(10φ + 1) possible unique val-
ues in the AUC-Log-Loss tuple (the +1 is to take
into account the case when AUC is Not-Defined).
Using the pigeonhole principle, for any dataset D
with |D| = n, a necessary condition for unique
inference is that 2n ≤ 10φ(10φ + 1), which
gives φ & ⌈0.151n⌉. Conversely, with a preci-
sion of φ significant digits, one can only hope to
uniquely identify labels for datasets of size at most⌊
log2
(
10φ(10φ + 1)
)⌋
≤ 7φ.
We can recurse over the remaining points in the
database in this situation, for exact inference in
at most ⌈n/6φ⌉. For example, using the IEEE
754 double-precision binary floating-point format,
which has at least 15 digits precision, at most⌈
|D|
90
⌉
queries suffice.
4 Exact Membership Inference Attacks
using a Log-Loss Oracle
Our observations provide insight into the extent
of information leakage from statistical aggregates
and how they can be exploited. A particularly in-
teresting application is designing stronger Mem-
bership Inference Attacks. These attacks were first
proposed to exploit the vulnerabilities of exposing
models trained on customer data to queries by an
adversary (Shokri et al., 2017).
In a recently open sourced implementation of an
auditing tool for measuring privacy leakage from
sensitive datasets (Murakonda and Shokri, 2020),
more refined aggregates like the Area Under the
ROC Curve (AUC) and Log-Loss scores are ex-
posed for simulating inference attacks as well as
to assess the total privacy leakage based on the ad-
versary’s predictions. In this threat model, our al-
gorithms demonstrate that this additional informa-
tion enables the adversary to improve its inference
accuracy and learn potentially sensitive informa-
tion about the distribution of data inside sensitive
datasets. The response to this query helps infer ex-
actly which datapoints were used for training.
There are multiple observations that one can
make about the Log-Loss based attack. First, the
adversary never queries the model under attack di-
rectly for prediction on any datapoints whatsoever.
This makes intuitive sense since the model does
not decide what specific data goes into its training.
Rather, it is the other way round. Second, the in-
teraction with the model curator is similar to the
interaction with the model interface in the attack
proposed by (Shokri et al., 2017) in that the adver-
sary seeks answers to queries that can help leak in-
formation about the training data. The only differ-
ence is the additional access to a Log-Loss oracle,
which helps make our attack purely deterministic.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we demonstrated how a single Log-
Loss query can enable exact inference of ground-
truth labels of any number of test datapoints. This
sheds light on how sensitive accuracy metrics can
be, even when they are computed on arbitrary
large datasets and do not intuitively seem to leak
any information.
An interesting question to ask is if other popular
metrics (like precision, recall, AUC) used in the
ML literature can be exploited for privacy leakage
in a similar manner. In (Whitehill, 2019), an AUC-
ROC oracle on the test dataset is used to deduce
the true labels in at most 2|D| queries. This opens
up opportunities to explore if exact inference on
all datapoints is possible with one AUC query.
Yet another interesting question to ask is if ex-
act inference is possible when the adversary learns
only a bound on or an approximate value in each
Log-Loss query it issues. Observe that by deciding
the size of the test dataset, the adversary also fixes
the number of possible values Log-Loss scores can
take. In a typical scenario where the adversary
has some prior knowledge about the amount by
which the reported score differs from the actual
value (see (Dwork et al., 2019) for an approach to
add noise to the reported scores), this discrete set
of possible scores can present a huge advantage –
the adversary can perform inference over the most
likely score under the constraint above. Nonethe-
less, a distribution over the labelings for the test
set can be learnt to bound the inference error.
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